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Abstract: Using a regional political ecology lens, this paper explores emerging geographies and 
politics of a “postnatural” ecomodernist turn in mainstream environmentalism. We examine the 
unfolding case of ecological restoration and renewable energy development at Southern 
California’s Salton Sea. Ambitious proposals to restore the massive, increasingly degraded lake 
(and finance restoration) by reengineering it as a hub for geothermal energy generation and high-
tech green industry hinge upon the ambiguity and malleability of restoration in an environment 
long classified as postnatural. These plans coincide with a broader rush on renewable energy 
sites in the California desert, and mounting conflicts over water and land with legacy agro-
industrial interests. The case illustrates significant problems within postnatural 
environmentalism. First, it demonstrates how theorizations of the postnatural can intersect with 
green capitalist projects of re(e)valuation and development, as the Sea’s managers manipulate 
environmental framings to support accumulation-minded projects, and accumulation imperatives 
swamp other functionalities of restoration. Meanwhile, despite the flourishing of postnatural 
discourses, the “pristine” is shown to do continued work as the Sea becomes a sacrifice zone for 
development deflected from better-protected spaces. This postnatural positioning has rendered 
the Salton Sea vulnerable to neoliberal austerity and speculation in ways that compromise its 
future existence.  
Keywords: California, political ecology, postnatural, ecomodernism, restoration, renewable 
energy 
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Introduction 
Today’s ongoing upheaval in environmental conservation and restoration poses complex 
questions for critical environmental scholars. Contemporary ecomodernist voices seek to 
crystallize a long-building shift: growing environmentalist interest in (or resignation to) 
engineering new natures on and for a “used” planet (Kareiva et al. 2012; Asafu-Adjaye et al. 
2015; Ellis et al 2013). This shift toward so-called “postnatural” environmentalism is evident 
across a broad landscape that includes, for example, wetland and stream restoration (Robertson 
2000; Lave et al. 2010), experiments in rewilding (Robbins and Moore 2013; Lorimer and 
Driessen 2016), and biomimicry (Goldstein and Johnson 2015). In the increasingly influential 
movement toward postnatural ecomodernism, technofuturist innovation becomes the key to 
green capitalist growth (Goldstein and Tyfield 2017; Knuth 2017; Knuth 2018). Meanwhile, 
deliberate ecological design replaces purportedly doomed efforts to ring-fence or reconstruct 
“pristine” non-human natures – imaginaries soon to be swamped by the planetary 
destabilizations and ecological novelty of the Anthropocene (Collard et al. 2015; Lorimer and 
Driessen 2016). 
Geographers and political ecologists have struggled to respond to this rising postnatural 
ecomodernist paradigm. On the one hand, it echoes political ecology’s longstanding critiques of 
preservationism’s dualistic fallacies, backward-looking nostalgia, and exclusionary politics (e.g., 
Cronon 1996; McAfee 1999). On the other hand, it recasts these critiques as permission to 
embrace overt anthropocentric utilitarianism and neoliberal accumulation (Robbins and Moore 
2013; Robbins 2014; Collard et al. 2015; Mansfield and Doyle 2017; and see Latour 2011, 2015; 
Robbins and Moore 2015). Critical geographers seek openings for a more liberatory, inclusive 
compositionism (Latour 2010), while warning that the new environmental relativism is already 
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enabling opportunistic market schemes and political manipulation. Increasingly, they 
recommend political ecology’s existing toolkit of situated, critical, contextual analysis for 
evaluating and responding to these dilemmas as new postnatural configurations unfold in 
practice. As Mansfield and Doyle (2017) put it, “our new task is to investigate how nondualism 
works, just as we need to continue to investigate how dualism works” (p. 26). 
Here, political ecology has an important task, one we take up in this paper. We argue that the 
emerging geographies of socio-spatial difference produced by postnatural and ecomodernist 
approaches to environmentalism have been underexplored. Abstract imaginaries such as a 
planetary “rambunctious garden” (Marris 2013) or terra nullius obscure a world of entrenched 
difference and unevenness – one only fitfully illuminated by references to familiar second 
natures (Smith 2010), “monsters” (Latour 2011), or sites of “experimental conservation theatre” 
(Robbins and Moore 2013). Political ecologists must more comprehensively and empirically 
explore what kinds of spaces are now being turned over to ecomodernist projects and postnatural 
design – and how, why, and with what impacts for whom. Conversely, we must examine sites 
where the new postnaturalism is being resisted, and assemblages and legal-regulatory 
apparatuses that are defending established ideological and material terrain (e.g., Collard et al. 
2015). Finally, we must examine how these spaces interact and collide within broader 
landscapes, and what spatial hierarchies and “sacrifice zones” (Hecht 2005; Klein 2014) these 
relations generate. 
In this paper, we turn a regional political ecological lens onto these questions, expanding upon an 
approach pioneered by Mansfield et al. (2015) (and see Walker 2003). We consider an 
environment framed as an eccentric and increasingly a monstrous (Latour 2011) human creation 
throughout its modern history: Southern California’s Salton Sea. Produced in an early 20th 
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century irrigation engineering accident, for a hundred years this 350-square mile lake 
(California’s largest) has been excluded from statutory environmental protections (Rudy 2005; 
Cantor 2016). Agricultural pollution, hypersalinization, and embattled water transfers have made 
the Sea increasingly noxious and hazardous to the human and more-than-human ecologies in and 
around it. In response, the Salton Sea’s managers have advanced a series of design and 
engineering proposals under the banner of ecological restoration, an often-ambiguous and 
inconveniently costly undertaking. Increasingly, they have turned to a raft of private partners and 
market schemes to populate and finance these visions, seeking a version of Salton Sea restoration 
with the power to pay for itself. The Salton Sea’s case offers a useful window into the broader 
turn towards the postnatural in the context of the emerging green economy.  
First, the case highlights how postnatural utilitarianism can assume multiple valences within a 
single project and place. The Sea’s proposed restoration incorporates not only ecological 
functionality, biodiversity conservation, and a range of anthropocentric uses, but also explicit 
programs for capitalist accumulation. The various “versions” of restoration (Mansfield et al. 
2015) articulated all fall within a context of neoliberal austerity and multi-scalar political conflict 
(see also Robertson 2000; Lave et al. 2010). We explore one proposed engine of restoration-as-
accumulation, a plan to develop the Sea’s geothermal energy resources for industrial production 
and recirculate profits to finance adjacent habitat construction. This speculative green capitalist 
project at the Salton Sea can be placed within a broader context of attempts to extract value 
through repairing and repurposing capitalism’s own degraded “wastelands” (Gidwani and Reddy 
2011; Fairhead et al. 2012; Dillon 2014; Goldstein 2014). We demonstrate the ways in which the 
plan echoes familiar processes of capitalist resource discovery and neoliberal speculation, 
introducing new calculations of speculative risk into an already vulnerable socio-ecosystem. 
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Second, we consider the ecomodernist re(e)valuation of the Salton Sea within a regional political 
ecological context of contestation over land and water resources. The Sea’s fate—and along with 
it, the health of the birds, fish, and humans who depend upon the water and air—is bound up in 
long-running water and land struggles in the rural US West, including an early 21st century boom 
in utility-scale solar and wind energy production and a rush on potential development sites 
(Brannstrom et al. 2011; Pasqualetti 2011; Mulvaney 2013 and see Bridge et al. 2013; Huber and 
McCarthy 2017). Renewable energy interests are further complicating Western land politics as 
they contend for space with legacy agriculture and resource industries, urban developers, and 
preservationists (McCarthy 2002; Walker 2003). Increasingly, managers promote the already- 
“disturbed” Sea as a uniquely convenient tabula rasa for low-conflict renewables siting, 
particularly as preservationists successfully contest unrestrained renewable energy development 
on “pristine” public lands. We argue that this move to shift production away from protected areas 
towards anthropogenic landscapes creates a sacrifice zone in Hecht’s (2005) sense of “deflected 
development” (Brannstrom 2009; Oliveira and Hecht 2016). Moreover, the area around the 
Salton Sea is doubly a sacrifice zone: increasingly sacrificed in Bullard’s (1990) environmental 
injustice sense as well (and see Klein 2014; Voyles 2017): those who face the worst 
consequences of the Sea’s decline include largely low-income agricultural workers whose health 
is jeopardized by its mounting air quality impacts (Cohen 2014). The Salton Sea, as an 
anthropogenic landscape, is currently being rendered an “other” that is subordinate to pristine 
lands. This analysis demonstrates in concrete ways that, despite mainstream implications, we are 
far from attaining a universal shift to a global postnatural state with evenly distributed benefits—
and harms.   
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Our examination draws on fieldwork which took place in 2012-2015 and included over thirty in-
depth semi-structured interviews with policymakers, water agency officials, local and state 
government representatives, environmental advocates, water law experts, and others involved in 
the Salton Sea and/or state-level water policy. Further research has included analysis of technical 
reports and planning documents, regional news sources, legal briefs, and other textual sources on 
water, energy, and land development in the Salton Sea region.  
 
California water battles and the re(e)valuation of a postnatural space 
Understanding the Salton Sea and its position in California politics requires taking on its peculiar 
history as an anthropogenic landscape. The Sea’s regulatory treatment as a postnatural space, an 
ecology outside the bright line distinctions and protections of California environmental law, 
stems from its status as an “accidental” and “unnatural” feature (Cantor 2016). In this section, we 
describe the history and recent events shaping this unnatural landscape, setting the stage for our 
discussion of postnatural restoration and related regional political-ecological struggles. 
Over the course of history, what is now the Salton Sea has alternately been a freshwater lake, 
saline sea, or dry desert playa depending on the historically fluctuating course of the Colorado 
River. Its modern form, and key parts of its present-day cultural and legal identity, were fixed 
just over a century ago (DeBuys 2001). In 1905, irrigation engineers inadvertently diverted the 
entire flow of the Colorado to the Sink for several years. The massive lake that resulted, today’s 
Salton Sea, has remained a water body due to ongoing agro-capitalist production and its wastes: 
the Sea is officially designated as a sump, a dump for agricultural runoff water and pollutants 
from surrounding industrial-scale agriculture in the Imperial and Coachella Valleys. 
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The Salton Sea’s monstrosity (Latour 2011), in the form of mounting pollution, noxiousness, and 
an increasingly surreal aesthetic, has also shaped its cultural and political life. In the 1950s, 
opportunistic developers framed the Sea as a mecca for sport fishing and recreation. Shoreline 
real estate speculation joined the desert California boom that made Palm Springs to the Sea’s 
north a year-round resort, as developers platted over 10,000 residential lots in major settlements 
like Imperial County’s Salton City. However, Salton City was largely abandoned in the 1970s, 
and the Sea’s other boomtowns proved similarly short-lived. Without a natural outlet, 
evaporation concentrated an ongoing inflow of agricultural pollutants to produce algal blooms, 
eutrophication, and a powerful rotten-egg stink (Cohen et al. 1999). Meanwhile, large-scale die-
offs progressively culled freshwater fish species that had been introduced at midcentury. 
Onshore, the Sea’s urban settlements have lapsed into a decaying landscape of post-apocalyptic 
vistas, drawing photographers who document beaches made of fish and bird bones alongside 
collapsed buildings and roads, street signs, and telephone poles laid out for housing never built.  
 
Wastewater politics and postnatural value 
Over the last few decades, the Sea has become a frontline of California water battles in the 
Anthropocene. The Sea’s degradation is now rapidly accelerating due to recent water transfers 
which ultimately threaten to revert it to dry playa, with devastating impacts on wildlife habitat as 
well as air quality consequences for those who live in the region (Cohen 2014). These water 
transfers are the result of agreements negotiated in the early 2000s, when California was 
regularly exceeding its legal allotment of water from the Colorado River, already the largest of 
any state. Facing rapid urbanization and new demand across the Southwest, the US Department 
of the Interior pressured California to come into compliance. Simultaneously, California faced 
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growing water demand from its own coastal cities.1 The powerful Imperial Irrigation District 
(IID), a large holder of Colorado River water rights2 and a major player in the Salton Sea’s 
ongoing management, came under particular heat in these struggles. Although environmentalists 
and competing water claimants have long decried the inefficiency of irrigating the arid Imperial 
and Coachella Valleys, the IID had successfully defended its large water claim for decades. 
However, in 2003, the Quantification Settlement Agreement (QSA) reduced California’s use of 
the Colorado River – which included leasing IID’s Colorado water rights to the San Diego 
County Water Authority (SDCWA). The IID is meant to use money from these sales to cut water 
“waste” by implementing efficiencies in water distribution and irrigation. More immediately, the 
IID has conserved water via fallowing, simply taking agricultural land out of production (Perry 
2013). 
Unsurprisingly, the IID’s concession has been unpopular with many of the Imperial Valley’s 
farmers. The region’s abundant and cheap water has helped it become a nationally dominant 
supplier of winter fruits, vegetables, and other crops, with crop sales topping $1.3 billion 
annually (US Census of Agriculture 2012). This outsize agricultural prosperity has produced a 
highly uneven landscape, sharply split along class lines between a small, wealthy group of 
landowners, many absentee, on about 500 farms3 and a poor, predominantly Latino, laboring 
population.4 The region’s high unemployment rate, twenty-one percent in 2016 (Corcoran and 
Segura 2016), reflects a fluctuating in- and outflow of farmworkers from Mexico, as well as 
residents living off the grid in unincorporated communities. The Imperial Valley’s agricultural 
elite speaks for this broader population with a heavy dose of irony. Nonetheless, farmer-activists 
have protested water transfers as sacrificing their rights and the Valley’s irrigated agricultural 
future to distant urban interests. 
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As the QSA’s significant reductions to the agricultural runoff feeding the Salton Sea take full 
effect this year,5 the state’s power to determine what constitutes “wasted” water usage has very 
real material consequences (Cantor 2017). With cuts to its inflow, the Salton Sea’s salinity will 
rapidly increase, threatening remaining fish and the bird species dependent upon them. 
Moreover, as the Sea evaporates more quickly than it is replenished, projections suggest it will 
shrink dramatically and (re)expose thousands of acres of playa to blowing wind. Fine dust from 
exposed lakebed, some laced with historical pollutants, threatens to create a serious air quality 
hazard, a fresh locus of environmental injustice in an already unequal region. If unmitigated, 
Salton Sea dust storms might cause as much as $37 billion in damage in the form of increased 
asthma and other health impacts over the next 30 years (Cohen 2014). 
Today, these political struggles, environmental degradation, and human health risks are fueling 
efforts to reimagine the Salton Sea as an anthropogenic but nonetheless functional ecosystem 
worthy of protection. Environmentalist advocates have argued that despite its “artificial” status, 
the Sea’s habitat has become increasingly necessary to millions of migrating birds on the Pacific 
Flyway, ones left with few other options in a region that has developed over many of its 
“natural” wetlands (Wilson 2010). In an interview, an ecologist explains this habitat importance, 
echoing concepts of the postnatural (although without using the more academic terminology 
directly):  
The Salton Sea was an accident in the historical time. It's well understood that over 
geologic time the river has wandered around, and the Salton Sea had water in it, and then 
it didn't have water in it. Now it has water in it. It was a human caused accident rather 
than a change of the natural flowing of the river, but there it is. The issue for it really is 
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when it comes to the habitat… The habitat issue is very real, regardless of whether it's an 
artificial lake or whether it's a natural lake. 
Critically, this framing of ecological value in an anthropogenic landscape, which is at the core of 
what we refer to here as postnatural, has gained significant formal support from the state.  As we 
discuss in the next section, state restoration mandates addressing concerns of habitat and air 
quality have sparked a raft of explicitly capitalist designs upon the restoration project. 
 
Ambiguities and vulnerabilities of “restoration” at the Salton Sea 
In negotiations over the QSA, the State of California passed the Salton Sea Restoration Act of 
2003, Senate Bill (SB) 277. In this Act, the California state government promised to come up 
with a durable plan to restore the Sea—and, crucially, to fund that restoration. However, fifteen 
years after the QSA and Salton Sea restoration were agreed upon, promised restoration activities 
have barely begun. In this section we argue that the difficulties in conceptualizing, funding, and 
actually constructing restoration projects at the Sea are not only a result of budget constraints and 
neoliberal austerity, but also tied to ongoing debates and ambiguities about what restoration 
means in a postnatural landscape (Robbins 2014; Collard et al 2015; Mansfield et al 2015).  
A primary barrier to restoration has been the daunting cost of reengineering a landscape of the 
Salton Sea’s scale. A 2006 California water bond had allocated $54 million for Salton Sea 
restoration. However, a year later, an estimate for the Sea’s comprehensive restoration cost came 
in at a whopping $8.9 billion (PEIR 2007). This funding demand arrived at an inopportune time. 
As California’s share of the US housing bubble began to deflate in the mid-2000s (Bardhan and 
Walker 2011), and the financial system as a whole collapsed in 2008, California unsurprisingly 
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faced a deep state budget crisis. As the state recovered (under ongoing austerity), funding for the 
Salton Sea failed to solidify, as the state considered and rejected a series of restoration plans and 
reshuffled formal authority for managing the Sea and its rehabilitation. 
In the face of fifteen years of delays and inaction from the state, actors involved in management 
of the Salton Sea, including landowners, irrigation district board members, developers, and 
government agency employees, have grown increasingly frustrated – especially as the IID has 
reached the end of QSA-required mitigation water (supplied to the Sea until 2018, it has until 
now somewhat postponed the Sea’s ecological decline). For years, regional actors unsuccessfully 
pushed the state government to become more active in Salton Sea management, arguing that 
since the state had pressed for water transfers and promised restoration in the negotiation of the 
QSA, it has a legal responsibility to handle related damages. However, as a state government 
agency employee described in an interview:  
There's been a lot of time and money spent on planning and very little done on the 
ground. They face a serious problem down there… There was an expectation by the 
locals for many years that the state was just going to come in on a white horse and just 
solve the problem. Just spend whatever it takes to make it happen. The legislature has 
demonstrated that it's not willing to just spend anything to resolve the issues at the Sea. 
Belatedly, some state restoration funding has begun to materialize, alongside a new 
comprehensive plan with a much-reduced price estimate of $3 billion (Hayden 2016) – and, most 
recently, a still-cheaper plan with a cost estimate of $383 million. In July 2016, the State of 
California allocated $80.5 million for building canals and wetlands along the Salton Sea 
shoreline, and several small projects have begun. In September 2016, the Obama Administration 
pledged an additional $30 million in federal funding (now in question after the 2016 Presidential 
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election). $200 million in further funding now awaits ballot approval from California voters. As 
the state dramatically scales back proposed ambitions for restoration, the Sea’s funding shortfall 
has shrunk accordingly – but at the time of writing, remains wide and uncertain, which hampers 
long-term planning efforts. 
The Salton Sea’s restoration funding dilemma – and, as we discuss in the next section, its 
proposed solutions – are not just a product of austerity budgeting. They are also deeply rooted 
within continuing debates about the nature of restoration. Determining what restoration means in 
a postnatural space like the Salton Sea is an overtly political question (see Robbins 2014) – one 
with real stakes. The Salton Sea Restoration Act called for a plan that would attain “restoration 
of long-term stable aquatic and shoreline habitat for the historic levels and diversity of fish and 
wildlife that depend on the Salton Sea” along with protection of air and water quality. These 
requirements are vague, strategically so. For example, the language of restoring habitat for 
‘historic levels’ of fish and wildlife does not specify a point in history, leaving the baseline for 
restoration ambiguous – a major issue in a historically shifting, non-equilibrium ecosystem. 
What should the Salton Sea be restored to? Moreover, the requirements raise debates about how 
to allocate responsibility – how to measure, and how to formally separate out liability – for the 
further deterioration of an ecosystem already declining before the QSA water transfer occurred.  
This vague mandate has been interpreted to license to various “versions” of a future restored Sea 
(see Mansfield et al. 2015). Proposals have included Promethean visions, such as recurring 
proposals for transnational pipelines to pump seawater from the Sea of Cortez into the basin. 
While the California Natural Resources Agency’s original $8.9 billion restoration plan (PEIR 
2007), developed to accompany the QSA, did not include pumped seawater, it did propose a 
complex civil and environmental reengineering of the Sea and its ecosystems. The plan included 
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construction of a massive rock berm around a reduced-size Sea, with a system of dikes, channels, 
and pumps for filtering salt and pollutants to a brine pool at the lake’s center. The rest of the 
basin would be “restored” either to dry lakebed, with various measures such as irrigated brush 
planting to suppress dust, or a series of shallow pools and constructed areas of wetland habitat to 
re-cover exposed playa. Subsequent restoration plans have accepted a future of shrinking inflows 
and a far smaller Sea. State proposals for a scaled-back partial restoration include the 2011 
Salton Sea Species Conservation Habitat Project and, most recently, its newly cheap(er) $383 
million restoration plan, the 2017 Salton Sea Management Program.6 This latest version of 
restoration at the Sea touts a “pragmatic” and “incremental” approach, diverting freshwater to 
gravity-fed canals and constructed ponds adjacent to the Sea’s current shore, to be built on a 
gradual schedule if and when funding comes through. Over the next ten years, the plan aims to 
cover 29,800 acres of the Sea’s bed in this constructed habitat—about 60 percent of what is 
estimated to be exposed by 2028 (James 2017). 
These designs embody significant differences in vision and scope; proponents and critics will no 
doubt continue to clash over the sufficiency of various plans. Strikingly, however, each of these 
designs for the Sea has historically billed its project as restoration. More traditionally “Edenic” 
versions of restoration are certainly not without arbitrary baselines and questionable re-creations 
of past conditions (Robbins 2014). However, Salton Sea restoration has demonstrated relativity 
on a different scale in the thoroughness of its departure from historical baselines. In a context in 
which any restoration might be more accurately labeled as large-scale ecological engineering, the 
rhetoric of restoration has proven flexible, or indeterminate, enough for divergent projects to 
claim its mantle. Today, the Sea exemplifies broader trends in postnatural restoration practice: as 
historical baselines (and aspirations to maintain them) erode, they are replaced by increasingly 
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unrestrained ecomodernist design (e.g. Robertson 2000; Lave et al. 2010; Mansfield and Doyle 
2017).  
 
An entrepreneurial re(e)valuation: Geothermal-for-restoration in a renewables boom  
The Salton Sea’s conceptual and material malleability as a postnatural space does not merely 
introduce convenient relativity into an intractable political mandate. Shifting understandings of 
what restoration can mean at the Salton Sea have also provided an opening for a specific kind of 
solution: a turn to green capitalism as a way to ostensibly save the Sea. Renewable energy 
development is increasingly gaining traction as a promising entrepreneurial scheme for Salton 
Sea restoration. In this section, we describe the proposed geothermal-for-restoration project, 
situating it within broader green energy development efforts across the region. We argue that this 
proposal demonstrates Johnson’s (2010) point that an opportunistic capitalism is well-capable of 
“accumulation by degradation.” In this case, entrepreneurial proposals capitalize on the Sea’s 
ambiguous status in far-reaching ways – and, in doing so, introduce their own set of speculative 
vulnerabilities.  
Since the late 2000s, entrepreneurs – and, critically, regional government entities like the IID – 
have proposed a series of entrepreneurial schemes and public-private partnerships that claim to 
be able to make the Salton Sea’s restoration pay for itself. These actors have sought to define the 
Sea as a frontier for resource discovery and accumulation – and to advance versions of a 
“restored” Sea that meet the needs of these projects. As a local developer explained in an 
interview: 
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There's a contingent of us in the private sector, renewable energy folks, real estate 
development folks, even environmental folks, who believe that we locally can take 
control of the Sea, invest in the Sea, and if we can do a paradigm shift to start looking at 
the Sea as an economic resource, we can probably figure out how to fund it. Fund the 
restoration effort without reliance, without significant reliance for the majority of that 
funding on the government. 
These public-private proposals have at times been overtly problematic. For example, regional 
governments both south and north of the Salton Sea have recurrently chased the possibility of 
new lakeside real estate development as a way of paying for restoration. The logic is that if the 
Sea is restored, land values along the shore will appreciate radically, and some of the putative 
profits of this potential growth can be diverted back toward restoration activities – a seemingly 
virtuous cycle of public benefit and private gain. One such scheme proposed to pioneer “natural 
resource tax increment financing” (Cunningham 2016), an adaptation of “self-financing” 
practices in urban redevelopment (Weber 2002). Many in and beyond the region have critiqued 
these real estate proposals as unsustainable and unrealistic. Not only do they inherit a long 
history of failed real estate development at the Sea, their success requires the alignment of 
multiple uncertain conditions. Tying restoration to land value speculation introduces serious risks 
that both the development and the restoration could fail. Based on this critique and others, such 
proposals are currently foundering amid legal challenges. 
 
Desert California’s renewable energy boom 
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Renewable energy development represents a more feasible entrepreneurial project linked to 
Salton Sea restoration. More broadly, new development politics are currently sweeping desert 
California as the region transforms into a globally significant center of renewable energy 
development. As a surge of large-scale solar projects transform places like the Imperial Valley 
(and sparks fresh political conflicts), local politicians have seen a unique opportunity to fund 
Salton Sea restoration – and to leverage a new claim upon a state that they argue has sacrificed 
and abandoned the region. The IID and its regional partners7 have argued that prioritizing large 
sections of newly exposed Salton Sea playa for renewable energy projects, especially geothermal 
power, is key to funding habitat construction and hazard reduction elsewhere at the Sea. Even as 
the State of California seeks belatedly to assemble more conventional restoration funding, 
political backers have continued to push this development agenda. 
To contextualize these efforts, in the mid-2000s, California entered a new era in its efforts to 
develop utility-scale alternatives to fossil and nuclear power. The state has for decades been a 
global leader in renewable energy, with roots in its 1960s-1970s environmental counterculture 
(Knuth 2018). This role has deepened in policy applications, including California’s climate 
commitments under the Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006 (AB 32). A recent expansion in 
California’s Renewables Portfolio Standard (RPS) is particularly noteworthy. Under 2002 
legislation, the RPS required California’s electric utilities to derive a certain percentage of their 
yearly retail sales from renewable energy sources, including solar photovoltaic and thermal, 
wind, geothermal electric, and other technologies. The requirement has been a critical support in 
growing markets for these resources. The Clean Energy and Pollution Reduction Act of 2015 
(SB 350) recently expanded California’s RPS to require fifty percent renewables by 2030, and 
the legislature is now debating more ambitious targets still. With these and similar policy 
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supports, the last decade has seen existing renewable energy technologies take off to an 
unprecedented extent across the Western United States. Today, renewable energy development is 
introducing a new value calculus for drylands, even those without historical water rights (long a 
dominant influence on rural land values in the US West). Wind power has seen steady growth 
over the last decade, including in Imperial County. More recently, the solar energy sector has 
seen a remarkable upsurge (Knuth 2018) – particularly in the high-insolation drylands of 
Southern California, Nevada, and Arizona – and the Imperial Valley has become of California’s 
leading epicenters for solar development (Hernandez et al. 2015). 
 
Value calculations and vulnerability in Salton Sea geothermal development 
In 2015, the IID and partners released the Salton Sea Restoration and Renewable Energy 
Initiative (SSRREI), a novel proposal to not only restore the Salton Sea, but also to fund that 
restoration. The IID’s plan makes a major case for geothermal, a renewable energy resource that 
they and other supporters argue has been given short shrift in the recent wave of US solar and 
wind development. The Imperial Valley has six of the state’s twenty-five Known Geothermal 
Resource Areas (KGRAs), including a major area around the Salton Sea, most of it still currently 
underwater8 (Gagne et al. 2015; Haase 2016). The IID’s plan envisions a “restored” Salton Sea 
reengineered into a hub of renewable energy resource development – but simultaneously frames 
this development as a fix for other restoration challenges (Gagne al. 2015; IID 2015).  
Making a bid for accumulation by degradation (Johnson 2010), the SSRREI reframes the lake’s 
shrinking size as an unexpected windfall. If the receding lake exposes 30,000 acres of playa 
between 2020 and 2030, 11,000 of those acres are likely to be within the Salton Sea KGRA – 
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thus newly open for production. Moreover, the infrastructure of geothermal plants would itself 
cover some of the playa exposed by the Sea’s recession, reducing health-damaging dust 
emissions and leaving room for adjacent habitat construction. In an indication that this plan has 
serious traction, the Sea’s most recent comprehensive plan retains space and access corridors for 
this geothermal development (James 2017). Besides geothermal energy, the SSREI also 
considers green energy-industrial development such as solar photovoltaic and solar thermal 
siting on the lakebed, algal biomass production for biofuels, and lithium extraction from 
geothermal brines.  
The IID argues that although its geothermal plan still requires upfront investment from public 
authorities, it will eventually transition into an income-generating venture, recouping money 
invested and then producing revenue for the government and its private partners. On top of 
requested allocations from the State of California’s massive drought-era water bond (Proposition 
1) and climate cap-and-trade revenue (SB 535, which requires investment in disadvantaged 
communities), the IID’s financing plan asks for a $1 billion direct upfront investment from the 
state, as an equity stake in a public-private partnership with the IID, Imperial County, and private 
renewable energy companies (IID 2015). The state would thus directly stand to benefit from 
exploiting its geothermal resources, provided it directed a portion of the profits to the Sea’s 
restoration. The IID suggests an additional $1 billion of this self-financing from thirty-year 
revenue bonds, paying for upfront development and restoration costs out of revenue collected 
from geothermal leases. Besides direct investment, lease income, and taxable profits, the IID has 
scoured its prospective renewables landscape for other potential revenue streams. Notably, it 
proposed a surcharge on local geothermal specifically tagged for restoration activities. As a local 
developer explained in an interview: 
	 19	
The objective is that, and this is always going to be a fight, with the private sector, with 
producers of the energy, is that you just take a little bit of that margin, that profit that you 
make on a kilowatt hour… just give us one percent of your per kilowatt hour price, and 
allow that to go into funding additional improvements to restore the Sea. And…that 
actually becomes a lot of money. 
 
At the time of this writing, entrepreneurial geothermal companies had already taken interest in 
these plans.9 However, the economic feasibility of the IID’s geothermal-for-restoration plan is 
under question. The National Renewable Energy Lab’s 2015 evaluation notes that renewable 
energy may not be as profitable for the region as the IID’s projections indicate. NREL estimates 
$1.5 billion of potential revenue – as opposed to the $4.1 billion projected by the IID’s own 
feasibility study (Gagne et al. 2015). According to the NREL report, charging a special 
restoration fee to funnel money to the Salton Sea may simply deter the development of local 
geothermal plants.  
The plan to save the region’s air and birds by generating restoration funding via geothermal 
development thus hinges on a critical—and contested—calculation of value. The success of the 
geothermal-for-restoration plan is by no means guaranteed. This introduces an element of 
speculative vulnerability that puts the health of the already-vulnerable residents of the region at 
risk.  
 
Putting the Salton Sea to work: Deflected development in a green economy  
Proposals for restoration-linked renewable energy development at the Salton Sea are particularly 
significant because they highlight novel ways that the Sea’s crisis, and its status as a postnatural 
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space, are being made to do work both in and beyond desert California. Here, we follow political 
ecologists who call for scholarship examining the impacts and agendas of postnatural politics 
(e.g. Mansfield et al 2015; Collard et al 2015). In this section we describe how the Salton Sea’s 
crisis—the looming threats to air quality and wildlife habitat—have been leveraged by various 
actors to support their agendas. First, the Sea’s plight is being leveraged by Imperial Valley 
farmer-activists in their long-running struggle to maintain the valley’s future, historically linked 
to irrigated agriculture and now facing new threats in a land rush on renewable energy sites. 
Second, the debates over restoration at the Salton Sea have significance for the shape of a green 
energy economy in and beyond California, as politicians reference the decline of the Sea to 
justify a more generally transformed energy development calculus.  
 
On a local scale, the Imperial Valley’s efforts to defend its historical water rights have used the 
Salton Sea as a political bargaining chip.  These efforts, present in the IID’s original negotiations 
around the QSA,  have been given new fuel by the State of California’s failure to secure 
promised restoration funds for the Salton Sea. In 2014, the IID petitioned the State Water 
Resources Control Board, arguing that if the state continued to renege on its promised restoration 
funding, the IID would be within its rights to halt water transfers to coastal cities (IID 2014; Roth 
2015). At the same time, California’s deep drought in the 2010s made these hardball water 
politics increasingly risky for the IID. The drought saw a wave of regulatory crackdowns on 
water overexploitation that were previously thought politically untenable, including urban water 
conservation requirements, forced fallowing of farmland across the state, and new regulation of 
groundwater extraction – causing some to question anew agriculture’s large share of California’s 
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water (Nicholls 2015). These disruptions to the political status quo presage further intensification 
of California water conflicts under climate change conditions (Hayhoe et al. 2004).  
 
A renewables land rush and the politics of the pristine 
On a regional scale, the Salton Sea has played a role in broader struggles around green energy 
and green development. California’s late 2000s surge in large-scale renewable energy 
development was fueled both by state mandates and federal government policies, as the Obama 
Administration laid out a green economic development program in and after the post-2008 
stimulus. Notably, the administration committed to site 20,000 megawatts of renewable energy 
on federal lands and waters by 2020, working with agencies like the Bureau of Land 
Management (BLM) to open up their massive land holdings to renewable energy siting – 
including a major swathe of never-developed public land in the California desert. Quickly, 
however, this policy provoked political blowback: environmentalists charged that it represented a 
rush on public lands with little consideration of the environmental costs of this “green” 
development. Critical scholars are increasingly adding their voice to this critique, pointing to 
utility-scale solar and wind installations’ massive geographic footprints and potential for 
landscape transformation (Bridge et al. 2013; Mulvaney 2013; Huber and McCarthy 2017). In 
California, activists were particularly concerned with the renewable boom’s potential to undo 
decades of efforts by environmentalists to reframe the Mojave and Sonoran deserts as a set of 
unique and sensitive ecosystems worthy of formal environmental protection.  
 
Responding to environmental protests, in the late 2000s the State of California and the BLM 
initiated a large-scale planning process (the first of its kind) to evaluate renewable energy 
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development, especially on the state’s “pristine” dryland habitats. So far, Phase I of the 2016 
Desert Renewable Energy Conservation Plan (DRECP) plan has blocked siting renewables on 
more than ninety percent of the originally proposed federal land. Instead, the planning process 
has sought to deflect development (e.g., Hecht 2005) to land it classifies as already “disturbed,” a 
categorization that opens up private farmland as a priority development site for renewables. This 
search for “win-win” opportunities for siting renewables on environmentally degraded land is a 
part of broader Obama Administration efforts, which targeted mining sites, urban brownfields, 
and other contaminated and devalued spaces. However, the DRECP plan quickly provoked 
outcry from farmers in places like the Imperial Valley. In Imperial County, the planning process 
initially targeted over 700,000 acres of private land for priority renewable energy development, a 
large portion of the Imperial Valley’s irrigated farmland. This designation is now being contested 
by farmers and litigious grassroots organizations like Backcountry Against Dumps and the 
Protect Our Communities Foundation, who frame land conversions for renewables development 
as a new and serious threat to the agricultural future of the valley. At the time of this writing, the 
BLM under the Trump Administration is considering amending the DRECP to re-focus 
development on public desert lands. Final siting for renewables on California state and private 
lands is now being fought out in the DRECP’s Phase II. 
 
The geothermal-for-restoration plan thus seeks to make use of the Sea’s postnatural status and its 
crisis in several ways. First, the IID has discursively deployed the Salton Sea’s urgent restoration 
needs in appeals for broader shifts to California’s renewable energy policy. In response to the 
plan’s questionable economic feasibility, the IID has ramped up its advocacy with the State of 
California: if geothermal is not sufficiently profitable to save the Salton Sea, perhaps the state 
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should make geothermal more profitable via targeted subsidies. This regulatory transformation is 
arguably necessary for geothermal to compete with other renewable energy sources; more 
pointedly, it is required for the IID’s speculation on geothermal profits to pencil out. While 
justifying their geothermal advocacy with gestures toward the general good, local politicians 
have consistently leaned on the Sea’s crisis as a call for the state to reform its renewables policy. 
Second, the plan implicitly positions the Sea as a space that can be imagined as empty and 
conflict-free, making it an important substitute for both federal lands withdrawn from 
development and heavily contested private lands. In doing so, the plan leverages the Sea’s 
degradation in order to “deflect development” away from better-defended terrain, echoing 
Hecht’s concept of “sacrifice zones” (Hecht 2005), which we discuss in more depth in the 
conclusion. 
 
Conclusion 
In this paper, we have used the details of a particular regional political ecological case to provide 
a window into uses and abuses that ecomodernist, postnatural environmentalism can sustain in 
application. As Mansfield and Doyle (2017) suggest, this type of critical examination is a key 
task in a time when widespread adoption of the idea of the Anthropocene risks pushing more and 
more of the world into relativist ethical evaluations and utilitarian, overtly anthropocentric 
treatment. As we evaluate the case of the Salton Sea (and the region in which the Sea is 
materially and politically embedded) for broader lessons, situated evaluative judgments, and 
possibilities, we suggest a few initial takeaways.  
We argue that this case illustrates several limitations of postnatural environmentalism. Despite 
the influence of postnaturalism and ecomodernism within conservation and restoration 
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communities, this is no universal, and certainly no universally beneficial, shift. Instead, this 
exploration demonstrates concrete ways that geographic difference and unevenness continue to 
matter within environmental politics on the ground. As we demonstrate, the Salton Sea’s 
particular context and history matter: for example, the lake’s exclusion from regulatory 
protections and inability to claim a clear historical baseline for restoration have certainly freed its 
managers to dream big and creatively in their ecological design and engineering visions. Indeed, 
many of the experiments surveyed here would be impossible in an environment more firmly 
ring-fenced with statutory protections. At the same time, the Salton Sea has suffered from this 
“freedom” and relativism: in its gradual degradation; in its particular vulnerability to neoliberal 
austerity as it became a problem case for the state; in the speculative opportunism of many green 
capitalist schemes to “save” it.  
Indeed, we suggest that postnatural management is a key vector of “sacrifice” at and of the 
Salton Sea. Although Mansfield et al. (2015) caution that we must not simply assume that all 
such anthropogenic landscapes are by-definition sacrifice zones, the concept speaks to the Salton 
Sea’s experience on multiple levels. This assertion holds true for both Hecht’s (2005) sense of 
deflected development and, often, the more pointed formulations of place/population 
disposability and environmental racism advanced by environmental justice scholars after Bullard 
(1990) (e.g., Klein 2014). In this latter sense, Imperial Valley agriculture historically rendered 
the Salton Sea an ecological sacrifice zone by dumping its wastes in the system for a century 
(Voyles 2017). Moreover, Imperial Valley farmers and water managers invoke another – if more 
questionable – form of alleged sacrifice in the US West, as they combat pressures to cede settler 
colonial property rights to distant urban entities (McCarthy 2002; Walker 2003). These perceived 
takings include water transfers like the QSA as well as renewable energy development, fought by 
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some as an intrusive land grab for faraway power users (Brooks 2016). More worryingly still, we 
have emphasized how aptly Bullard’s more classic environmental injustice conception fits here: 
in the final calculus, the lake’s degradation will have markedly uneven consequences and stakes. 
If projects to save the Sea fail, the Imperial Valley’s majority-poor and Latino human inhabitants 
will be on the front line of the impending public health hazards (Voyles 2017; Cohen 2014). 
Following Hecht’s (2005) sense of sacrifice zones further is equally enlightening. Hecht 
describes a case of anthropogenic landscapes placed into relation with Amazon conservation 
mandates and subjected to intensified agricultural production and environmental degradation in 
order to, in theory, “spare” the protected system (Brannstrom 2009; Oliveira and Hecht 2016). 
The Salton Sea’s anthropogenic landscape is somewhat different, as is the type of capitalist 
intensification, supposedly non-extractive industrialization, proposed for it. Assessed as a local 
land use, there is nothing inherently degraded or degrading in IID’s imaginary of a new second 
nature of green energy-industrial production and constructed habitat at the Salton Sea. 
Nevertheless, this postnatural treatment is critically defined by the Sea’s statutory non-protection 
and subordination to better-defended spaces, which include both “pristine” landscapes (desert 
areas protected by conservation assemblages and statutes) and alternate “disturbed” landscapes 
(farmland defended by agro-industrial interests).  
This case also illustrates the ways in which ideas like the postnatural are taking a central role in 
the re(e)valuation of resources for green economic development, including the remaking of 
statewide energy policy. Exploring the role of large-scale renewable energy development as a 
leading face of that transformation illustrates the interplay between state and regional 
government and private development in what can be viewed as a resource grab (e.g., Fairhead et 
al. 2012). Public and private interests are coming together to push forward green capitalist 
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proposals that are technofuturist in outlook, accumulation-minded (while also state-sponsored, 
furthering accumulation for both private and public purpose), and overtly willing to engage in 
manipulation of environmental framings and categorizations in support of their projects. The 
valuation process includes redefining and reclassifying harms and goods and enclosing 
previously elusive spaces, with material impacts on the fish, birds, and humans who have 
previously relied upon the waste(d) commons (Cantor 2017). In this light, the relativity of the 
postnatural can be viewed as simply one conceptual tool being put to work in a broader project 
of shifting resource valuation.  
While we have discussed how the postnatural can be put to work in the justification of green 
capitalist development, the Desert Renewable Energy Conservation Plan conversely 
demonstrates the continuing political power of traditional environmental(ist) dualisms and 
prohibitions. Some formulations of the postnatural turn imply that environmentalism’s “Edenic” 
communities of practice will voluntarily cede their entrenched power as critiques and shifting 
conditions expose core fallacies and hidden politics (e.g., Robbins 2014). This case suggests that 
environmental managers may instead double down on their historical remit in the Anthropocene 
moment, hoping to bolster “islands of Holocene ecosystems” (Collard et al. 2015, from Kareiva 
et al. 2012) against both systemic destabilizations like climate change and proximal stressors – 
including those arising from ecomodernist green capitalism itself. In mitigating (for now) 
speculative ecomodernist ambitions for the California desert, the DRECP demonstrates that, 
however flawed, notions of the pristine continue to do work when supported by sufficiently 
forceful conservation assemblages and legal-regulatory apparatuses – a useful reminder for 
negotiating situated political responses and necessarily messy tactical alliances. In desert 
California and many regions like it, these assemblages may well provide the most immediate and 
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formally empowered line of defense against the excesses of technofuturist geoengineering and 
ecomodernist land grabs. 
Finally, the Salton Sea’s postnatural ecomodernist proposals are most immediately showing 
strain in characteristically neoliberal dimensions. First, public accountability is limited. That the 
Salton Sea’s symbolic restoration program has persisted while the plan’s material scope 
progressively shrinks should provoke disquiet. As yet, society has no mechanisms for holding 
postnatural managers to account for diminished engineering ambitions and failed design 
promises. Second, and perhaps more worrying still than the scaling back of what Salton Sea 
“restoration” actually signifies, is the growing tendency of accumulation imperatives to swamp 
other design features and considerations in these plans. The reasons are not particularly 
surprising: beyond enthusiasm and opportunism from the private sector, the push for 
entrepreneurial restoration schemes flows directly from neoliberal austerity and attacks upon the 
power of the state. Even as the Salton Sea’s managers hope that promised resources from the 
State of California will materialize at the eleventh hour, their current design proposals have been 
thoroughly captured by entrepreneurial imperatives and fiscal financialization. Not only do these 
market schemes threaten to crowd out other functions of postnatural ecological design and 
constrain more creative and liberatory compositionist imaginaries, they present more immediate 
speculative dangers. To tie successful restoration to the success of geothermal development or 
any other market scheme at the Sea is to speculatively mortgage the region’s environmental 
health to capricious market forces. If any one of multiple threats to these accumulation schemes 
materializes—if the State of California is unmoved by appeals to make geothermal more 
profitable, if electricity prices change dramatically and unexpectedly in the future, or if the Sea’s 
new geothermal ventures fail – a common occurrence for start-ups in general and for capital-
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intensive green economic start-ups in particular – the Salton Sea’s future could be effectively 
foreclosed.  
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County and the Torres Martinez Desert Cahuilla Indians. 
8 NREL researchers estimate that the Salton Sea region could produce up to 1.8 GW of geothermal energy 
by 2030, with about 1.3 GW in the Salton Sea KGRA.  
9 For over fifteen years, energy generators had run a relatively static set of geothermal operations at the 
Sea, dominated by Warren Buffett’s CalEnergy. However, in recent years, the region has attracted new 
business; for example, ventures experimenting with technologies to mine geothermal brine for resource 
recovery. An Australian company called Controlled Thermal Resources has recently entered the region 
with plans for a massive new geothermal facility, five times larger than the Sea’s existing plants. 
																																								 																				
